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Relationship Banking and SMEs 






Reliable information on small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) is rare and costly for 
financial intermediaries. Therefore relationship banking is often considered as the appropriate 
lending technique. In this paper we offer a theoretical model to analyze relationship banking 
and the pricing behavior of banks in a Bertrand competition framework with monitoring costs. 
We show that the lack of reliable information leads to comparably high interest rates even if a 
long-term relationship between borrower and bank exists. The paper offers a theoretical 
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1. Introduction 
Typically in industrialized countries, small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) account 
for more than 90 percent of all firms, they employ about two-thirds of the workforce, and 
contribute to nearly 50 percent of the value added in non-agricultural production. They are 
often considered to play an important role in growth promotion and poverty reduction (Bank 
1994, 2002, 2004; Beck et. al 2003; Wagenvoort 2003). Nevertheless, it seems to be a global 
phenomenon that SMEs are confronted with relatively harsh credit constraints (Beck and 
Maksimovic 2002; European Commission 2002; Beck et. al. 2004).  
Until now the analytical framework concerning price-setting behavior of banks and 
information availability on SMEs the has been underdeveloped. Since reliable information on 
SMEs is rare and costly, relationship lending is often considered as the most appropriate 
lending technique for collecting information on SMEs (Boot and Milbourn 2002): the firm 
and the bank enter in a long-term relationship that assures the firm’s access to credit and gives 
the bank access to information about the firm (Allen and Saunders 1991; Nakamura 1992; 
Berger et. al. 1999; Boot 2000). One important characteristic of such a relation is the increase 
of the value of the information (Schaefer 2003). Therefore, one could expect that loan interest 
rates should decline over time. However, recent empirical and theoretical literature on 
relationship banking offers ambiguous results: Peterson and Rajan (1994) suggest that loan 
interest rates decline with relationship lending.
1   The opposite effect is described by 
Greenbaum et. al. (1989) and Sharpe (1990); they demonstrate conditions under which 
lenders subsidize borrowers in early periods and are reimbursed in later periods.
2 Based on 
so-called “soft” information, this lending technique is mainly generated by the bank’s past 
experience with a given lender. 
Here, we take a closer look at this problem and develop a theoretical model to analyse the 
effects of the lending technique on the interest rate. Previous studies, where perfect 
competition is impeded by asymmetric information, show that professional financial 
intermediaries like banks can benefit from economies of scale in obtaining information about 
borrowers (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Diamond 1984, 1991; Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1984; 
Boyd and Prescott 1986).
3 The main difference between our article and these previous studies 
is that we focus on profit maximization of banks and take into account the specific lending 
technique used by banks.  4 
We show that the choice of the lending technique is crucial for the cost function of the bank. 
These costs occur from the costs of monitoring borrowers, the costs of refinancing credits and 
the costs of lending to borrowers who cannot pay back their credit (bad loans). The lending 
technique affects two components of the costs of a bank. First, the lending technique 
determines the monitoring cost curve. Second, it affects the efficiency of monitoring and 
therefore the share of bad loans in the portfolio of banks.  
We argue on the basis of a Bertrand competition framework - frequently used in the credit 
market literature (Dell´Ariccia et. al. 1999; Jun and Vives 2004). An important advantage of 
this type of competition is that polypoly effects are generated in the duopoly case. Therefore 
differences in lending techniques are not superposed by duopoly –effects, i.e. by strategic 
interactions between banks or firms. The lack of borrower market power is a key assumption 
of Bertrand competition (Gal-or 1986; Bracoud 2002). We show that there exist linkages 
between the chosen lending technique and the loan interest rate. The major finding of our 
paper is that with a longer duration of the lending relationship, loan interest rates are not 
reduced. Furthermore, we show that in markets where banks rely on relationship lending, 
borrowers are charged higher interest rates compared to markets where relationship lending 
and credit scoring/financial statement lending coexist. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we develop a model of 
banking with different lending techniques. In section 3 we discuss the results of the model, 
while section 4 offers conclusions. 
 
2. The Model 
Financial intermediaries need information on potential borrowers. Only on the base of 
sufficient information they can make an efficient decision whether to finance a given 
investment project or not. Nevertheless, reliable information on firms is not always publicly 
available. Especially SMEs usually are not forced to use sophisticated accounting techniques 
and to publish their balance sheets. Therefore information on these enterprises is relatively 
costly. In such a case a financial intermediary might try to use relationship banking to collect 
information on the potential borrower over time.  
In general, a bank has the possibility to monitor borrowers and to gain information on 
potential investment projects. Monitoring causes costs ( ) t . The incentive for banks to 5 
monitor arises from the assumption of prohibitive costs in the case of non-monitoring. If a 
bank chooses the relationship lending technique monitoring costs are a function of the 
maturity of the bank-borrower relation. In the case of financial statement lending they are 
constant and do not vary with the duration of the bank-borrower relationship (table 1). 
Consequently, if banks differ with respect to the lending technique, they will have different 
(monitoring) cost curves (box 1). But does relationship lending lead to lower interest rates for 
borrowers with long-term relationships?  
<insert table 1> 
<insert box 1> 
2.1 The general structure of the model 
We assume a number ( ) A  of borrowers. Each of them wants to realize a single investment 
project that requires one unit of funding and generates a random return. These borrowers are 
atomic and therefore have no market power. Market demand for finance is generated by a 
continuum of investors represented by the atomic probability space ( ) ,, AAv. Let the demand 
function : dA ++×→     be such that the integral  ( ) (,) () A D p d r a dv a =∫  is well defined for 
every r ++ ∈  . For any borrower aA ∈ ,  (,) dra specifies his demand if he can borrow at any 
given (positive) interest rate r .  The total market demand function  () D ⋅  indicates  the 
aggregate amount of credit that all investors together are willing to take at a given (positive) 
interest rate (e.g. Allen and Hellwig 1993). 
The firms can have either good or bad investment opportunities, so that there is a share of ( ) q  
good and () q − 1  bad investment projects. The return of the projects  () g z  is characterized by a 
binary random variate () z  which can adopt the values 0 or 1;  { } 0,1 z∈ . If z is 1, then the 
project is successful and the return is non-zero; if z is 0, then the return of the project is zero 
as well.  
It is assumed that average return  ) 1 ( g
G λ  of good projects ( ) q  is higher than the “save" loan 
interest rate:  (1)
G
s g r λ ≥ . Conversely, for bad projects ( ) 1 q −  the average return falls below 
the safe loan interest rate: (1)
B
s g r λ < . Because even the firms with bad opportunities can be 6 
successful with their projects and even the firms with good opportunities can fail, parameter 
1
G λ ≤  defines the probability of success for good and the parameter  1
B λ <  for bad projects.  
We further assume that there exist two banks, i  and j ; at least one of them relies on 
relationship lending. Banks are the unique providers of funds and have access to competitive 
capital markets where they can fund themselves at the exogenous interest rate p .   
For simplification we assume that the distribution of borrowers regarding the maturity of their 
bank relationship is a continuous line with one borrower at every point, like pearls at a pearl 
necklace. A bank does not know the behavior of the other bank and thus tests if it can 
underbid its competitor by setting lower loan interest rates. It is further assumed that a bank 
knows the share of good projects in its portfolio. Hence the expected  ) ˆ (ϕ  and real shares of 
good projects (ϕ ) are assumed to be equal ( ) ϕ ϕ = ˆ . This leads to the typical Bertrand demand 
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 with  , ij R as payoff function, 
, () ij D r  as demand for credits, i for banks  2 , 1 = i and  j i ≠ . 
Consequently, the banks in the market maximize profits and play a non-cooperative Bertrand-
Nash competition game. In this setting, the payoff function shows what each player will 
receive as the outcome of the game in terms of market share. In the following sub-sections we 
turn to the bank side of the game. There we show the possible interest rates which a bank can 
charge according to its specific cost function.  
 
2.2 The benchmark model: a relationship lending duopoly  
Consider a market with two banks that rely on the relationship lending technique. This means 
that every bank has “soft” information about the business of a firm (e.g. reliability of the 
borrower, history of the firm, firm’s perspective and new markets). Monitoring firms is costly, 7 
therefore both banks only monitor their own share of the market ( ( ) x  or () x − 1) .
4   Each 
borrower is causing different monitoring costs depending on the maturity of the lending 
relationship. In general, there are two explanations for the assumption of a decline in 
monitoring costs over time: first, because of better knowledge of e.g. the quality of intangible 
goods, the firm’s local market, and export opportunities, the quality of information rises and 
the costs of additional data collection diminish. Second, asset-based lending is used as a 
substitute when the relationship is in an infant state (Boot 2000); since this lending technique 
is cost-intensive, switching to relationship lending reduces these costs.  
The banks i and j identify potentially good investment projects with a monitoring efficiency 
of  , ij φ   and lend to firms with these investment opportunities. Since both banks are 
relationship banks, monitoring efficiency is the same,  ij φ φ = . Due to the assumed perfect 
foresight, the marginal costs  , ij mc are: 
(1.1)  ,, , ˆ (( 1 ) ) / ij ij ij mc f t x ϕ =+ −  
where  j i, ˆ ϕ  is the expected share of successful projects based on information from previous 
periods,  , ij f  is the cost function of a specific bank and t(1-x) reflects the actual monitoring 
costs . For each credit, both banks face funding costs  j i p , . The cost function of the banks is: 
(1.2)  j i j i j i j i p q q f , , , , )] 1 )( 1 ( [ φ φ − − + =  
5, with q reflecting the share of good and 1-q the 
share of bad projects.     
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Knowing the profit function of the banks, we can think about the possibility of any positive 
interest rate a relationship bank can charge in this Bertrand-Nash game. On the lower range of 
possible interest rates (interest rates below marginal costs (MC)  ( ) ,, 0,
MC
ij ij r µ  
6) neither bank 
assigns positive probability. This is obvious since the corresponding profit  , ij π  would  be 
negative for both banks. The medium range of possible interest rates is defined by 
() ,, , ,
MC LBMC
ij ij ij rr µε  +   with the parameter  0 ε > ; if ε  equals one this means marginal cost 
pricing. The range of this interval is defined from marginal cost pricing to least borrower 
marginal cost pricing (LBMC).  For this entire interval the probability of realization is 0 since 
there exists at least one slightly higher interest rate which results in larger profits. This is 
caused by monitoring costs rising marginal costs above the average level. Therefore if a bank 
i can underbid its competitor j  by a marginal reduction of r , this bank i  would gain the 
whole market, but because of rising monitoring costs would lose profit even if it does not 
serve the whole market. There is only one interval of possible interest rates left: 
() ,, ,
LBMC
ij ij r µε  +∞  . In Nash equilibrium, if a bank charges interest rates above marginal 
costs  0 ε > , expected profits will be zero since this bank expects the other bank to underbid 
its interest rate. Therefore the probability of a bank choosing a higher interest rate than least 
borrower marginal cost is zero. 
Result 1: 
Bertrand competition does not lead to marginal cost pricing.
7  This is caused by 
monitoring cost advantages of relationship banks that prevent (perfect) competition 
except market border competition. Consequently, the banks have no incentive to price-
discriminate, i.e to charge loan interest rates equal to marginal costs. The banks use 9 
uniform pricing and charge all borrowers marginal costs of short relationship 
borrowers. 
In the usual reasoning, the unique pure strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium equals marginal 
costs 
**
, ij i j p pm c == . As Harrington (1989) pointed out this is the only equilibrium outcome 
when firms produce at constant marginal costs and market demand is bounded, continuous, 
downward sloping and has a finite choke-price. In this model we assume information 
asymmetries caused by the different length of lending relationships. As our result shows there 
is only one possible equilibrium: an interest rate (price) equal to the least borrower marginal 
cost. Figure 1 provides an illustration. Due to the assumed symmetry of banks this is exactly a 













This equilibrium, market share enables the banks to make positive profits. Profits are F1 for 
bank i and F2 for bank j. Charging the least borrowers marginal cost is reflected in point a in 
figure 1. 
 
<insert figure 1> 
 
2.3 Differences in Lending Techniques - the Access of SMEs to External Funds  
We now turn to cases where SMEs are forced to make financial reports that can be used in 
financial statement lending or credit scoring. We assume that bank i relies on relationship 
lending and bank j on financial statement lending. As mentioned in section 2.1, monitoring 
costs for the bank with relationship lending differ between the borrowers. In contrast, the 
bank with financial statement lending faces the same monitoring costs for each borrower,  j t .  
















 with  ij ϕ ϕ = . 
8 10 
For banks engaging in financial statement lending, Bertrand competition implies loan interest 










The marginal cost pricing of financial-statement-lending banks results in zero profits: 
(2.2)  ( ) 0 = − − = j j j j j t f r Aϕ π  
Since the financial statement bank’s information is publicly available, market entry of another 
financial statement banks is likely if the financial statement bank charges loan interest rates 
higher than marginal costs.  
The average loan interest rate charged by banks engaged in a market where financial 
statement lending is possible is lower than the average interest rate in a pure relationship 
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As a consequence, equilibrium loan interest rate is lower than the marginal costs of 
relationship lending banks (least borrower marginal cost). Therefore this bank serves only the 
part of the market which is below the point where the sum of monitoring costs and funding 
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On the lower range of possible interest rates, just like in 2.2  ( ) ,, 0,
MC
ij ij r µ   , again none of the 
banks assigns a positive probability. This is obvious since even in this case the corresponding 
, ij π  would be negative for both firms. However, in this case marginal costs differ. There are 
three possible cases:  
Result 2a) 
In the first case, marginal costs caused by the borrower with the longest relationship 
are above the marginal costs of the financial statement lending bank. Therefore, 
anticipating the possibility to underbid the competitor, the financial statement lending 
bank would charge marginal costs and gain the whole market. This bank could 
increase its profits with higher prices, so it raises interest rates until a level slightly 
below marginal costs of the relationship lending bank’s long duration borrowers.  
Result 2b) 
The second possible case is that the marginal costs caused by the relationship lending 
bank’s borrower with the longest relationship equals marginal costs of the financial 
statement lending bank. In this case the Bertrand-Nash game leads to zero profits for 
both banks. 
Result 2c) 
In the third case marginal costs of the relationship lending bank are below the 
marginal costs of the financial statement lending bank. In this case the medium range 
of possible interest rates is defined by  ( ) ,, , ,
MC LBMC
ij ij ij rr µε  +  , with  0 ε > , which 
means marginal cost pricing. For this result the probability is 0 for the relationship 
lending bank since there exists a slightly higher interest rate which results in larger 
profits. This is due to the monitoring costs which cause marginal costs to rise above 
the average level. Therefore, if the relationship bank can underbid its competitor by a 
marginal reduction of r , this bank would gain the whole market, but due to rising 
monitoring costs the bank would lose profit even if it does not serve the whole market. 
Again there is only one interval of possible interest rates left,  () ,, ,
LBMC
ij ij r µε  +∞  . If a 
bank would charge interest rates above marginal costs of financial statement lending 
bank,  0 ε > , expected profits would be zero since this bank expects the other bank to 12 
underbid its interest rate. Therefore the probability of one bank choosing a higher 
interest rate than the financial statement bank’s marginal cost is be 0. 
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the case 2c for two scenarios of high and low financial 
statement marginal costs. If one argues that the market for loans to SMEs is 
characterized by a low level of available information, this would result in a market for 
relationship lending as it is shown in figure 1 or it would lead to relatively high 
marginal costs of the financial statement lending, as it is shown in figure 2. With rising 
information, like it is the case for large companies, marginal costs of financial 
statement lending are reduced. This is shown in figure 3, where the relationship 
lending bank has only a small share of the market compared to the financial statement 
lending bank.  
Furthermore, figure 2 reflects two possible extensions. If we assume a need to get at 
least half of the market, the relationship lending bank would subsidize the area F1b 
with the area F1a. This would be the case if the bank has to gain young borrowers 
which have, by assumption, high monitoring costs. The second additional assumption 
is the possibility of switching the lending technique from relationship lending to 
financial statement lending. The prevailing lending technique would in this case be 
relationship lending until a critical market share, and after this point financial 
statement lending (dotted line in figure 2). In figure 3 both assumptions are included, 
but with low marginal costs of financial statement lending; the area F1b extends the 
are F1a. Therefore subsidizing young borrowers is no longer possible without profits 
to be less than zero. 
 
<insert figure 2 and figure 3> 
 
3. Interpretation of the Results  
In our model we analyze the impact of the lending technique on SME finance and we explain 
the behavior of a relationship bank in different market environments. We show that in three 
variations of the model, relationship lending has advantages for a bank – but not necessarily 13 
for the borrower.  Additionally, we show that if there is a bank which is engaged in financial 
statement lending, this bank is restricting the advantages of the relationship lending bank. 
The central results of the model are:  
•  Relationship-lending banks exploit information advantages that result from their 
lending technique.  
•  If one bank relies on financial statement lending, this bank drives down the profits of 
the relationship lending bank by reducing the market price. 
•  In the case of low monitoring costs for financial statement lending, the relationship 
lending bank serves only a small fraction of the market. Loan interest rates are directly 
proportional to financial statement monitoring costs. 
•  Average monitoring costs are lower in the case of relationship lending. Nevertheless, 
the cost advantages of relationship lending do not necessarily lead to a lower interest 
burden for SMEs.   
The model yields interesting results. First, relationship lending leads to relatively high loan 
interest rates compared to other lending techniques. Second, when assuming a lower 
efficiency of credit scoring, this type of market structure leads to lower interest rates than 
relationship lending. Third, the lowest interest rates are realized in a market with one of the 
banks being a financial statement bank.  
The model results stress the importance of the availability of different lending techniques to 
reduce borrowers’ loan interest rates. In practice, especially the market of SMEs lacks high 
quality accounting data, which makes these firms more dependent on relationship banking 
than large companies. Since relationship lending leads to high loan interest rates, SMEs suffer 
from high costs of external funding. For large companies, a much higher degree of 
information is public and therefore available without any costs to financial intermediaries. 
This enables the banks to apply transaction based lending (financial-statement-lending or 
credit-scoring) which reduces loan interest rates.  
 14 
4. Conclusions and Outlook 
SMEs seem to suffer from limited access to external financial resources all over the world. 
Banks usually are reluctant to provide credit to this type of enterprises. This behavior is due to 
the relatively limited publicly available information about SMEs. Legal accounting 
requirements for these enterprises are low, so that managers of SMEs have only small 
incentives to invest in detailed information practices. It is often argued that this specific lack 
of information can be compensated by relationship banking, which enables banks to collect 
detailed information about an individual firm over time. Nevertheless this information is 
exclusive. That’s why there exists a close linkage between the lending technique of a bank 
and the interest rate offered to a firm. While relationship lending leads to relatively high 
interest rates the burden is much lower in the case of financial statement lending. 
These results have far-reaching implications for the recent discussion on the introduction of 
international accounting standards in Europe. There are strong arguments for an improvement 
of the current design of accounting standards specifically for SMEs. First, in order to be 
efficient, international accounting standards should apply to all types of enterprises. Second, 
additional information gained through this process would lead to an improvement in decision-
making. Both banks and enterprises would be the beneficiaries of such a change in the 
institutional framework. Third, the introduction of international accounting standards would 
have a self-containing, positive impact on competition within the banking sector.  
Given the large interest on the interdependence of banking and SME finance further research 
is necessary. Since our model is limited to the supply side, adding borrower demand would be 
a natural extension of the model. In such an extended framework interest rate effects are 
expected to be supplemented by reduced demand for credit.  15 
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Lending techniques reconsidered 
In general, lending can be categorized into at least four
10 distinct lending techniques. These 
practices differ mainly by the usage and generation of information (table 1):   
Relationship lending is based on the experience of a given bank with a specific borrower and 
therefore on “soft” information collected over time. Hence, if financial data is limited, 
relationship banking is the technique of choice. 
Financial statement lending is based on evaluating information from the firms’ financial 
statements. The decision to lend depends largely on the strength of the balance sheet and 
income statements. Since SMEs face less legal requirements than large companies to publish 
financial data, financial statement lending is likely to be the technique of choice in bank 
lending to large firms (Udell 2004).  
In the case of asset-based lending, credit decisions are principally based on the quality of the 
available collateral. This type of lending causes high monitoring costs and requires high-
quality receivables and inventory available to pledge (Berger and Udell 1995, 1998, Boot 
2000). That is why it is generally used as a substitute for relationship lending if the term of 
the relationship is short. 
Small business credit scoring is an adaptation of statistical techniques used in consumer 
lending. In addition to information about the financial statements, the creditworthiness and 
history of the owner is heavily weighted (Frame et. al. 2001). In practice, small business 
credit scoring is mostly used for micro enterprises (Saunders 2001) and is a substitute for 
financial statement lending with few monitoring costs but a high possibility of wrong 
declarations by the borrower.  
The most important characteristic of the first type of lending is that it is based on “soft” 
information. Banks may acquire information through the relationship by monitoring borrower 
performance over time under credit arrangements and/or through the provision of other 
services such as deposit accounts. In contrast to this, the other three types of lending are based 
on “hard” information. Thus, the main difference between these two groups of lending is the 
availability of information to competing banks. Relationship banking is based on collecting 
information over time and therefore produces private information that is only available to the 
specific bank or to a banking network. Since this information cannot be interpreted out of this 





Table  1: Lending Techniques 
 Type  of 
information 




         
Relationship lending         
 
private information 
about the firm and 
the owner 













depends on the 





Asset based lending         
 
credit collateral  no credit loss if 
credit volume is 
in the limit of 
collateral value 
not modeled                
 
Credit scoring         
 
standardized 
financial data of 
owner and firm 
depends on the 
quality of the 
available data but 
can be only a 
proxy of financial 
insight 










1  In concentrated relationship-lending markets, Petersen and Rajan (1994) find that loan 
interest rates decline less than in competitive markets because they are subsidized in 
favor of young relationships. This supports somewhat Greenbaum et. al. (1989) and 
Sharpe (1990). 
2 By engaging in long-term relationships, firms transmit information about the company and 
its projects to the bank and can therefore reduce loan interest rate and collateral 
requirements (Alen, Sounders and Udell 1991; Nakamura 1993). Boot and Thakor (1994) 
demonstrate this relationship in a theoretical model without learning effects. 
3 An article similar in spirit to ours is Rajan (1992), which discusses the incentive of firms to 
prevent banks from extracting surplus from them. 
4 We assume that a part of the market x  is served by bank i  and the other part () 1 x −  is 
served by bank  j . 
5 It is assumed that the bank knows which share of projects will be successful, but does not 
know the probabilities of success of a single investment project. The bank does not lend 
to projects which are identified as bad (the bank lends to i qφ   identified good and 
() () i q φ − − 1 1 wrongly identified bad creditors) 
6 With µ  as the function of possible interest rates. 
7  The Bertrand type competition does not lead to extreme outcomes because of non-
homogeneity of monitoring costs. However, if the Bertrand-competing banks prefer 
activity, a reduction in loan interest rate r* would lead to a marginal profit below 
marginal costs. We follow Bracoud (2002) in arguing that even if banks prefer activity, it 
does not lead to irrational behavior in enhancing market share even if marginal profits are 
lower than marginal costs. 
8 We will get comparable results to this case if we consider a credit-scoring bank alternatively 
to the financial statement lending bank. The only difference between the two techniques 
simply is a lower level of monitoring efficiency for the credit scoring bank:  
creditscoring financialstatement relationshiplending φφ φ <=  reconsider  that  φ   is assigned as monitoring 
efficiency of banks.  
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9 This equilibrium is static and does not hold for a dynamic case since no new borrowers are 
served. In a dynamic case, it is suggested that the bank subsidizes new borrowers by 
lending at the cost of old borrowers. 
10  Mostly two lending technologies are described in literature – relationship lending and 
transaction based lending. For our purpose we follow Berger and Udell (2002) which is a 
bank based view rather than the broader six technique view in Udell (2004) who includes 
factoring and trade credit.    